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Disentangling Demand-Enhancing and Trade-Cost Effects of
Maximum Residue Regulations
Bo Xiong and John Beghin

Abstract: Maximum residue levels (MRLs) regulations in plant products can create
unnecessary trade barriers on one hand and enhance demand via risk mitigation or quality
assurance on the other. We stipulate a generalized gravity equation model to disentangle
the effects of MRLs on the import demand and foreign exporters’ supply. Applying the
framework to the MRLs on pesticides imposed by high-income OECD countries, we find
that the MRLs jointly enhance the import demand and hinder foreign exporters’ supply.
In addition, exporters from the less and least developed countries are more constrained by
the MRLs than their competitors from the developed world.

Keywords: maximum residue level, sanitary and phytosanitary, food safety, nontariff
barriers, gravity model.
JEL classifications: F14, Q17

1. Introduction
The Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been
effective since 1995. The two agreements are designed to reconcile the member countries’
right to apply SPS and TBT measures to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of human health and the environment, while keeping the resulting trade
distortion to a minimum. Over the past decade, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO
dealt with an increasing number of trade disputes citing either the SPS or the TBT
agreement and claiming that certain regulations had created unnecessary trade barriers and
constituted protectionism in disguise (World Trade Report, 2012).
The implications of SPS measures and TBTs for international market access and
welfare are more complex than those of traditional price-based trade barriers, such as tariffs
and countervailing duties, because SPS and TBT regulations often address market
imperfections. The corrective role of SPS measures and TBTs ranges from alleviating
asymmetric information in the marketplace (e.g., labeling requirements) to mitigating risk
in the consumption of certain products (e.g., restrictions on aflatoxin contaminants in edible
nuts) and enhancing the sustainability of the eco-system (e.g., quarantine policies
preventing exotic pests and diseases invasion). Therefore, SPS measures and TBTs are
likely to affect both consumers and producers’ incentive structures and alter their behavior
accordingly.
From the perspective of producers and processors, the cost of complying with the
SPS or TBT regulations can be high. The fixed costs may include the upgrade of practice
codes and facilities, the acquisition of certificates, conformity in marketing requirements,
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etc. In addition, inspection and testing procedures at custom points may cause prolonged
delivery time, rejection of certain shipments, or even denial of entry completely.1
Therefore, the proliferation of SPS measures and TBTs can significantly reduce a country’s
imports from its trading partners, and even drive some foreign suppliers out of the market.
This is the trade-cost effect, which corresponds to the “standards as barriers” argument in
the international development literature (e.g., Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh, 2001; Anders
and Caswell, 2009).2
On the other hand, SPS measures and TBTs may enhance a country’s demand for
imports if the regulations address market imperfections (Thilmany and Barrett, 1997). For
example, mandatory labeling requirements in meat products can boost meat demand by
conveying quality information to consumers (Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina, 1998).
Alternatively, SPS policies can promote social well-being, in the form of better public
health, higher animal welfare, or more sustainable environment.3 In economies where the
consumer awareness of food safety, animal welfare, and plant health is high, the SPS
measures could stimulate more demand for products under regulation (Josling, Roberts, and
Orden, 2004). This is the demand-enhancing effect of SPS measures and TBTs,
corresponding to the “standards as catalyst” argument in the literature.
Therefore, SPS measures and TBTs either facilitate or hinder international trade,
depending on whether the demand-enhancing effect, if any, outweighs or falls short of the
trade-cost effect. This dual effect calls for a different analytical framework from those used

1
See for example the U.S. monitoring programs for food imports at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/importrefusals/
2
Note that the trade-cost effect is net of any efficiency gains from better production or distribution practice
induced by the SPS/TBTs. See Jaffee and Henson (2005) for more details.
3
See Peterson and Orden (2008) for an example of U.S. import ban on Mexican avocadoes (1915-1997)
due to the concern of invasive exotic species.
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to analyze conventional trade taxes.4 The conventional wisdom that trade liberalization
improves market access and welfare does not necessarily carry over to SPS measures and
TBTs. For example, in a case study of antibiotic residues in crustaceans, Disdier and
Marette (2010) show that tighter standards on antibiotic residues improve social welfare
at the expense of contracted international trade.
In this article we provide a novel methodology to disentangle the dual effects of
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs), as a particular SPS measure, on the imports of plant
products in high-income OECD countries. Exposures to pesticide and antibiotic residues
through diet can be harmful to humans and especially children (Eskenazi, Bradman, and
Castorina, 1999). Survey-based studies suggest that consumers value food safety such as
the reductions in risk associated with pesticide residues (Eom, 1994). Consumers’
valuation of risk mitigation provides incentives for importers and retailers to ensure
acceptable level of food safety, for either legal or reputation causes (Henson and Caswell,
1999). Most governments mitigate food borne hazards by either banning the most toxic
substances, or by limiting the degree of contamination in agricultural and food products.
Regulatory agencies can determine their own MRLs or rely on international
standards such as MRLs set by Codex Alimentarius, a joint body of the UN World Health
Organization and Food Agriculture Organization. Codex MRLs are science-based and
considered least trade-distorting. In the United States, for example, these MRLs are
regulated principally by the US Environmental Protection Agency with enforcement
functions by the US Food and Drug Administration, US Department of Agriculture, and
state enforcement agencies (USEPA, 2013). The EU, Australia, and Japan tend to have
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For example, Beghin, Disdier, and Marette (2012) apply the ad valorem equivalence approach to nontariff measures in agriculture and find that some non-tariff measures translate into negative trade taxes.
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MRLs much more stringent than the Codex MRLs whereas many other countries have
their standards near or explicitly follow the Codex recommendations. A few developing
countries such as Sri Lanka use lenient MRLs (Li and Beghin, 2012b).
Our proposed methodology identifies the demand-enhancing effect and the tradecost effect of MRL stringency separately based on one simple but essential fact: the same
MRLs affect different trading partners differently. For an exporting country that already
implements similarly stringent regulations at home, its exports to the market with a new
MRL policy would be little interrupted, because its producers and handlers have learned to
meet related regulations and are capable of meeting the MRL abroad at low cost. In
contrast, for a source country with no MRLs, its export prospects to a foreign market would
be severely impeded by MRLs in the destination market, because of the high compliance
costs for meeting the new regime.5 Empirically, the differential impacts of MRLs on
different exporters enable us to disentangle the two effects.
By investigating MRLs adopted by high-income OECD countries and their imports
of plant products from major trading partners, we show that the MRLs jointly enhance the
import demand for plant products and impede foreign supplier’ access to the markets of
high-income OECD countries. Moreover, we find evidence that exporters of plant products
from less or least developed countries are more constrained by MRL stringency than their
competitors from the developed world.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a conceptual
model leading to an econometric model in which the dual effects of MRLs are

5

The differential impacts of SPS and TBTs on different exporters are well documented in the literature. For
example, Disdier, Fontagné, and Mimouni (2008) show that SPS and TBTs in agriculture significantly
reduce the OECD’ imports from developing countries, but do not affect trade flows among the OECD
members.
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disentangled. In section 3, we describe the data and present the empirical results. In the last
section, we draw conclusions and discuss possible extensions.
2. The modeling approach
Our analytical framework characterizes the separate impacts of MRLs on the import
demand for and the trading partners’ supply of plant products. In equilibrium a
generalized gravity equation model emerges, which lays the foundation for an empirical
specification to be estimated in the next section.
2.1.

The import demand
There is a representative consumer in country j with preferences characterized by

the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility. All plant products are assumed
differentiated by sectors and by country of origins (Armington, 1969). For example,
“Japanese apples” and “U.S. apples” are distinct goods in the composite sector “apples.”
As discussed in the previous section, MRL polices mitigate food borne risk and affect the
import demand for the plant products under regulation.6
Specifically, the representative consumer in country j maximizes its consumption
utility subject to her budget constraint:
(1a)

max
U j  [ ( sj Qsijd )
d
Qsij

(1b)

s.t.

s

s

]

i

 P Q
sij

 1 
  1

d
sij

 Yj ,

i

where  sj is the representative consumer’s perceived quality of good s ; Qsijd is the
consumer’s quantity demanded for good s produced by country i ;  is the constant

6

The MRLs may also generate non-market values that are external to the consumer, such as risk mitigation
in public health or environmental sustainability in the long run. We abstract from this positive externality
because it is not reflected in the marketplace and the associated social values are difficult to measure.
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elasticity of substitution; Psij is the price of good s produced in country i and sold in
country j ; Y j is the national income of country j. The solution to the problem (1a)-(1b)
leads to country j’s import demand (in values) for good s originated from country i:
(2)

Vsijd  Psij  Qsijd 

 sj 1 Psij1
j

Yj ,

where  j   s  i  sj 1 Psij1 is the consumer price index in country j . Note that, for   1 ,
the above import demand is positively related to the importing country’s income and the
consumers’ quality perception, but negatively related to the price of the good.
The information disclosed by the MRLs, among other factors, alters the
consumer’ preferences for the product. In particular, we parameterize  sj as
(3)

 sj   s 0 exp(  MRLsj ),

where  s 0 is the consumer’s quality perception for good s in absence of MRL regulation;

MRLsj is the stringency index of MRLs for sector s in country j , with larger index
representing more stringent MRLs (i.e., lower tolerance levels) ;7  is a parameter to be
estimated that captures the degree to which the MRLs affect the import demand.
Intuitively, (3) characterizes the demand-enhancing effect, or the quality improvement
effect, associated with the MRLs. As an implicit assumption in our characterization of the
import demand, the MRLs apply to imports of all origins, which is consistent with the nondiscrimination principle of the WTO.

2.2.

The foreign exporters’ supply
There is a representative producer for each sector in each country. The goods sold

7

See the next section for the definition of the stringency index.
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by this producer in different destinations are imperfect substitutes because she tailors the
specifications of her products to the marketing requirements in each market. For example,
U.S. apples targeting the Japanese market are grown and handled differently to conform
to the SPS regulations in Japan (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster, 2008). The representative
producer for sector s in country i is endowed with a production capacity Qsi and a
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) technology (Geraci and Prewo, 1982;
Bergstrand, 1985).8 The CET technology allows the producer to transform products for
different destinations. The problem for the representative producer is to decide which
markets to target and how much to sell in each destination. Denoting  si as the set of
countries the representative producer for sector s in country i decides to serve,9 we
characterize the producer’s problem as
(4a)

max
s

{Qsij } j si

(4b)

PQ

j si

sij

s
sij

s.t. [  ( sij Q )
j si

s
sij

 1 
  1

]

 Qsi ,

where Qsijs is country i’s quantity of good s supplied to country j;   0 is the elasticity of
transformation, with a large in absolute value meaning easier transformation;  sij >1 is
the “iceberg melting” trade cost term:  sij units of good s have to be shipped out of
country i in order for one unit to arrive in country j . The solution to (4a)-(4b) results in
country i’s supply of good s to country j, in values, as:
8
The production capacity is fixed in the short run and exogenous to MRLs. We leave out the long-run
effect of MRLs on the production capacity because our data set exhibit limited time variation.
9
For tractability, we do not explicitly model the endogenous choice of  si . However, we account for

countries’ self-selection to export by using the Heckman sample selection model in the empirical section.
Interested readers are referred to Chaney (2008) for a theoretical characterization of firms’ decisions to trade
and Kim, Reimer, and Gopinath (2011) for an empirical application to Korean manufacturing firms.
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(5)

V  Psij  Q 
s
sij

s
sij

Qsi sij1
si Psij 1

where si  [ j  sij P
 1

si

,



1  1
sij

]

is the producer price index for sector s in country i ,

reflecting the cost of exporting to all possible destinations. Note in (5) that the foreign
exporter’s supply is positively related to the production capacity of the exporting country
and the price of the good, but negatively related to the cost of trading between countries.
The bilateral trade cost arises from various factors such as import tariffs,
geographical distance between the two countries, cultural similarity, and the difference in
MRL regulation in particular. As a convention in the gravity model, we parameterize the
trade cost,  sij , as

 sij  (1  Tarsij )(1  Distij )b exp(bp Langij )exp(bb Bordij )exp(bcColij )
d

(6)

 exp(br Relij )exp( max{MRLsj  MRLsi ,0}),

where Tarsij is country j’s tariff rate imposed on good s from country i; Distij is the
distance between country i and j ; Langij is the common language dummy variable that
equals one if the two countries use the same official language; Bord ij is the common
border dummy variable that equals one if the two countries are adjacent; Colij is the
colonial dummy variable that equals one if the two countries had a colonial relationship
in history; Relij is the proportion of two populations that speak a common language;  ,
bd , bb , bc , br , all presumably positive, are parameters to be estimated.
The new source of trade cost in (6) is the difference in MRLs between trading
partners. Intuitively, our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs highlights the
differential impacts of MRLs on different exporting countries. Exporters from countries
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with lax or no MRL regulation ( MRLsj  MRLsi ) have to overcome additional costs to
reach the stringent limits required by the importing country. However, exporters who
have been subject to tougher MRLs in their domestic markets ( MRLsj  MRLsi ) are less
likely to experience trade disruption from MRLs variation in the importing country,
because of their capabilities to comply with the regulation at negligible or low cost.10 As
a by-product, our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs naturally accommodates the
harmonization of standards between countries. For example, MRLs do not cause
additional cost of trade if both trading partners adopt international or regional standards.
2.3.

The equilibrium
In equilibrium, consumers’ import demand equals foreign exporters’ supply in

each sector and for any pair of countries. By imposing the market clearing condition
Vsijd  Vsijs , we solve for the equilibrium trade value, Vsij , and the equilibrium price, Psij , in

sector s and for exporting country i and importing country j . Specifically, (2) and (5)
lead to
(7a)

(7b)

Psij  (

Vsij  (

Yj

j
Yj

j

1

)

 

)

1
 

 1

1


( si )    sj    sij   ,
Qsi
1

 1


Q
( si )   ( sj )
 sij
 si

(  1)(1 )
 

and

.

Equation (7a) suggests that the equilibrium price is increasing in the importing country’s
income level, Y j , the perceived quality of the imports,  sj , and the trade cost between the
two countries,  sij ; but it is decreasing in the exporting country’s total supply, Qsi .
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Our characterization of the trade cost of MRLs is similar to the heterogeneity index used by Winchester
et al. (2012) and Liu and Yue (2013).
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Equation (7b) shows that the bilateral trade value is increasing in the importing country’s
income level, Y j , the exporting country’s capacity, Qsi , and the quality of the imports,  sj ;
but it is decreasing in the trade cost between the two countries,  sij . Substituting (3) and
(6) into (7b) and taking the logarithmic transformation, we arrive at the following
characterization of bilateral trade values in equilibrium:
(8)
ln(Vsij )  Y j   j  (1   )Qsi  (1   ) si   ln(1  Tarsij )   bl Lang ij   bd ln(1  Distij )
 bb Bordij   bc Colij   br Relij   max{MRLsj  MRLsi , 0}   MRLsj ,

where   (1   ) (   ) and   (  1)(1   ) (   ) .
Equation (8) forms a generalized gravity equation model in which the demandenhancing effect and the trade-cost effect of MRLs are identified separately.11 When an
importing country increases its stringency (variable MRLsj becomes larger), both effects
are at work. On one hand, the more stringent regulation boosts the import demand because
of the informational gain or the quality improvements associated with the new regulation.
On the other hand, the tightening of the MRLs imposes additional costs upon the foreign
supplies. This extra hurdle can be either significant or trivial, depending on whether the
foreign supplies have been subject to similar regulations in their home markets. The
differential impacts of MRLs on exporters of different origins allow us to disentangle the
two effects in empirical applications.
By disentangling the dual effects of MRLs on international trade, our conceptual
model leads to more plausible policy implications based on fundamental factors in the

11

See Evenett and Keller (2002) or Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2003) for the linkage of the gravity
model to various trade theories. See Novy (2013) for a recent study of global trade costs using a variant of
the gravity model.
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world market for agricultural products. In particular, our model explicitly captures how
both sides of the market react to MRLs, which enables us to better interpret the evidence
accumulated in the literature. For example, Xiong and Beghin (2012) find that EU’
harmonization and tightening of aflatoxin residue standards in 2002 has not significantly
reduced Africa’s groundnut exports to Europe. The negligible net effect of the MRL is
consistent with either an inconsequential regulation, or the two significant effects on EU
groundnut demand and Africa’s groundnut supply cancelling out. Policy implications are
drastically different between the two cases. While the former scenario requires no action,
the latter case suggests that technical assistance to groundnut producers and processors in
Africa would help them reap the high premium of safer groundnuts. Our disentangling
approach can be used to discern the two cases and offer relevant policy recommendations.
3. The empirical application

We apply the above model to examine the impacts of MRLs adopted by high-income
OECD countries on their imports of plant products. The literature provides mixed
evidence regarding the conventional wisdom that the MRLs distort international trade in
agricultural commodities. The estimated impact of MRLs on trade is sensitive to the
products of concern, the country groups of interest, and to some extent the estimation
methods, spanning from significantly trade-impeding to significantly trade-facilitating (Li
and Beghin, 2012a). Related to our investigation, Winchester et al. (2012) find weak
evidence that the difference in MRLs on pesticides and veterinary drugs between EU and
its trading partners hinders EU’s imports of plant and animal products, but without
accounting for possible demand enhancement effects. By disentangling the dual effects of
MRLs, we improve upon the existing literature and offer a cogent rationalization of these
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various outcomes.
3.1.

The empirical strategy
The conceptual model, characterized by (8), provides a basis for the empirical

specification. One caveat in the execution is to appropriately account for the effects of two
unobservable factors,  j and si . As suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
the two price indices can be interpreted as the multi-lateral trade resistance terms in the
importing and the exporting country respectively. Feenstra (2003) further shows that
importers’ and exporters’ fixed effects can fully control for the effects of these price
indices in cross-sectional analyses. A panel analysis would require the inclusion of yearspecific importers’ fixed effects and year-and-sector specific exporters’ fixed effects in
the specification. To reduce the dimension of the econometric specification, we use yearspecific importers’ fixed effects and year-and-chapter specific exporters’ fixed effects.12
Note that the income effects in the importing countries are entirely absorbed by the yearspecific importers’ fixed effects.
To accommodate zero trade flows, we use the Heckman sample selection model
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman model has two major advantages. First, it explains the
absence of trade by exporters’ self-selection, which is consistent with the new trade
theory featuring heterogeneous firms and fixed costs.13 Second, the Heckman model
allows exploring the impacts of MRLs through affecting both the volume of trade, or the
intensive margin, and the propensity to trade, or the extensive margin. From the
12

Specifically, our data set covers 4 years, 60 exporting countries, and 109 plant products falling into 6 HS
chapters. Replacing year-and-sector specific exporters’ fixed effects with year-and-chapter specific
exporters’ fixed effects reduces the dimension from 21160(=4*60*109) to 1440(=4*60*6).
13
Another estimator capable of capturing zero trade flows is the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimator (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). However, Martin and Pham (2008) show that PPML
leads to biased estimates when zero trade is a censored outcome. The update by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2011) does not address the issue of censoring either.
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perspective of international development, the effect along the extensive margin bears
important policy implications because small traders are likely to be deprived of
international market access, because of the food safety policies.
Consistent with (8), our empirical specification is as follows:
(9a)
ln(Tsijt )  (1   )Qsit   ln(1  tarsij )   bd ln(1  distij )   bl Langij   bb Bordij   bcColij
 max{MRLsjt  MRLsit , 0}   MRLsjt  fe jt  fehit   sijt ,

(9b)
*
Dsijt
 (1   * )Qsit   * ln(1  tarsij )   *bd* ln(1  distij )   *bl* Langij   *bb* Bordij   *bc*Colij
*
 *brk Relij  fek   * * max{MRLsjt  MRLsit ,0}   * * MRLsjt  fe*jt  fehit
 sijt ,
k

(9c)
ln(Tsijt )
ln(Vsijt )  
 n.a .

*
if Dsijt
0
,
otherwise

where Tsijt is the ideal amount of trade in the absence of countries’ self-selection to the
*
world market, Dsijt
is a latent variable capturing the binary decision to trade or no trade,

and Vsijt is the actually observed trade flow. Variable fe jt is the fixed effect for the
importing country j in year t, fehit is the fixed effect for HS chapter h in the exporting
country i in year t. Equation (9a) explains the size of bilateral trade while (9b)
characterizes the likelihood that the two countries trade with each other. The two error
terms in (9a) and (9b) may be correlated due to omitted trade determinants that affect
both the size and the propensity of trade.
We estimate (9a)-(9c) jointly using the two-step procedure.14 The identification of
the model requires an excluded variable that potentially affects the fixed cost of trade but

14

Alternatively, one can estimate the system by the maximum likelihood approach. However, the
computational complexity causes convergence problems in our application.
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not the variable cost of trade. Following Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), we
choose the common religion variable as the exclude variable.15 Furthermore, to allow
possible heterogeneity across agricultural sectors in the self-selection process, we use the
interaction terms of the chapters’ fixed effects with the common religion variable.16
Finally, we address the possible endogeneity of MRLs. Lobbying efforts of
domestic industries can influence public policies, such as MRLs. However, it is unclear
from the existing studies whether food safety policies are more driven by the protectionist
motives or legitimate social objectives.17 In our application, the potential bias due to the
endogeneity problem is limited because the fixed effects capture the difference in policy
designs across countries and sectors to a large degree.
3.2.

The data
MRLs are frequently updated by regulatory agencies across countries. We use two

data sources for the MRL information: the global MRL database developed by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Homologa database available from the
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the United Kingdom. The USDA
database consolidates the currently effective MRLs on pesticides applied to plant
products and veterinary drugs applied to animal products (USDA-FAS). These MRLs are
listed by pesticide or drug type, by commodity, and by country (inclusive of Codex). The
Homologa database contains historical MRLs but the country coverage was highly
restricted to the developed world prior to 2008. We take two cross-sections of the global
MRL regulations: 2008 from Homologa and 2012 from USDA-FAS.
15

Our choice is also justified by the pragmatic reason that the common religion variable is statistically
insignificant in the simple OLS regression based on (9a).
16
We thank the editor for this suggestion.
17
See the World Trade Report (2012) for a summary of case studies of the political economy of SPS
measures and TBTs.
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To measure the restrictiveness of the MRL regulation toward a given product in a
given country, we follow Li and Beghin (2012b) and define the following stringency
index of MRLs:
1
(10) MRL jk =
N(k )

N( k )

MRLcodex ,kn( k )  MRL jkn( k )

n( k ) 1

MRLcodex ,kn( k )

 exp(

),

where MRL jkn( k ) is the MRL adopted by country j , for product k , and targeting pesticide
n( k ) ; MRLcodex ,kn( k ) is the MRL recommended by Codex for the same product and
pesticide combination; and N ( k ) is the total number of pesticides applicable to product
k .18 According to (10), the tougher a country’s MRL regulation towards a product, the

larger the index is for that combination of country and product. In addition, the stringency
index reduces to one if a country defers to the Codex completely. An index above one
would indicate that, averaging over various pesticide types, the MRL regulation is more
restrictive than Codex for the product of interest and the country under consideration.19
Next we turn to the product and country coverage. Following Li and Beghin
(2012b), we identify 109 plant products of which the commodity descriptions can be
mapped with either the 4-digit or 6-digit product codes in the Harmonized System.20 We
focus on bilateral trade flows from 61 exporting countries to 20 importing countries.21
The selection of the exporting countries is based on the MRL data availability. The
importing countries under consideration are 20 high-income OECD economies, where
consumer awareness and valuation of food safety is arguably high and carries weight in

18

Missing MRLs for some pesticides are replaced by the default tolerance levels in each country.
See Li and Beghin (2012b) for more discussions of the properties of the stringency index.
20
See Table A in Appendix A for the list of plant products.
21
See Table B in Appendix B for the list of importing and exporting countries.
19
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public policies and retailer behavior. Consequently, the adopted MRLs are likely to affect
the food demand and these countries are good candidates for our purpose.
To allow enough variations over time, we retrieve bilateral trade series from UNCOMTRADE for the year 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012. We match the 2008’s MRLs with
trade flows in 2007 and 2008, and the 2012’s MRLs with trade data in 2011 and 2012.
The underlying assumption is that the MRL stringency does not vary significantly within
two consecutive years (or even over the course of four years, as shown in Table 1 below).
To proxy the production capacity in each sector in each country, or Qsit , we sum the
country’s exports of the product to all destinations.22 We drop observations for which the
potential exporting countries do not export to the rest of the world at all.
We also include other sources of bilateral trade costs. We use the tariff data from
the Macmap database of the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre.23 The tariff
rates are ad valorem rates computed from national tariff lines as of 2010.24 Note that we
choose the tariff year different from the trade years of interest to avoid the endogeneity
issue in computing the tariff rates. As standard practice in gravity analysis, we also
include cultural variables such as the colonial tie dummy variable, the common official
language dummy variable, the common border dummy variable, and the distance variable
are sourced from the CEPII database.25 In addition, we use the common religion variable
from Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) as the excluded variable in our
specification. In addition, we drop the trade flows within EU because the intra-EU trade
is considered systematically freer than usual cross-border trade.
22

Strictly speaking, our measurement of production should be interpreted as exportable production,
because domestic consumption is not accounted for.
23
The database documentation and access are available at http://www.macmap.org/
24
The 2010 tariff information is unavailable for Korea, for which the 2007 rates are used.
25
http://www.cepii.com/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
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We present the summary statistics for the MRL stringency indices in Table 1.
Averaging across 109 plant products and the 20 importing countries, the MRL stringency
index is 1.34 in 2012 and 1.38 in 2008, which implies that pesticide control measures in
the high-income OECD community are systematically tougher than the Codex standards.
Although the MRL stringency is fairly constant over time, there is a trend among OECD
countries, EU in particular, to loosen their MRLs and harmonize with the Codex
recommendations. The MRL stringency index for an average country outside of the highincome OECD community is close to unity, indicating that the associated MRLs
generally gravitate around the Codex levels.
The comparison of the stringency indices between trading partners reveals that
more than 60 percent of bilateral trade records in the sample correspond to flows of plant
products from countries with relatively lax MRL regulation to countries with relatively
tougher standards. Trade flows in the reverse direction constitute slightly less than 30
percent of our sample. In addition, less than 10 percent of the trade flows occur between
countries with equally stringent MRLs.
Table 1. Summary statistics for the MRL stringency indices
2012
2008
Variable
Mean Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
High-income OECD’ stringency index
1.34 0.49
1.38
0.47
Other countries’ stringency index
1.01 0.18
1.02
0.24

Comparison of MRL stringency
MRL is tougher in the importing country
MRL is tougher in the exporting country
Equal stringency between trading partners

Frequency
64%
29%
7%

Frequency
68%
27%
5%
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3.3.

Results and discussions
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients in the system (9a)-(9c). Both estimated

effects of MRLs are statistically significant and bear the expected signs in the outcome
equation. The evidence of the demand enhancement associated with MRLs lends support
to the hypothesis that pesticide control measures alleviate information asymmetry by
assuring the food safety of the products under regulation. Therefore, MRL regulation in
plant products achieves legitimate public objectives and does not necessarily translate
into protectionism. In the selection equation, we find that countries with tougher MRLs
are more likely to import from other countries, and that the difference in MRL
regulations has negligible implications for bilateral trade partnership.
Table 2. Estimated coefficients for high-income OECD’s imports of plant products
Variable
Outcome
Selection
Variable
Outcome Selection
{parameter}
Equation
Equation
{parameter} Equation
Equation
-2.267*** -0.615***
Demand shifter
0.707***
0.152***
ln(Dist.)
(0.051)
(0.008)
(0.052)
(0.014)
{  }
{  bd }
0.529*** -0.240***
Trade-cost shifter -0.250***
0.013
Border
(0.110)
(0.033)
(0.059)
(0.016)
{   }
{ bb }
0.589*** 0.121***
ln(Prod)
1.209***
0.228***
Colony
(0.057)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.001)
{1   }
{ bc }
1.009*** 0.309***
ln(Tariff)
-1.535*** -0.456***
Language
(0.049)
(0.012)
(0.112)
(0.030)
{  }
{ bl }
Inverse Mills
3.629***
-Ratio
(0.100)
# of Obs.
58,603
315,397
Note: The year-specific importing countries’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific
exporting countries’ fixed effects are included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity.
Chapter-specific common religion variables are used as the excluded variables. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.

With regard to other sources of trade cost, import duties and distance are found to
hinder trade in plant products, with both elasticities well above one. A common border
increases the size of trade as commonly found in the literature, but the negative border

18

effect on the decision to trade is unexpected. A closer look at the data reveals that the
counter-intuitive result is driven by the fact that Israel trades much less frequently with its
neighboring countries. Colonial relationships in history help create trade partnerships and
enlarge the scale of trade. Countries with the same official language are more likely to
trade than otherwise. Further, we find that countries with larger production capacities
export more. In addition, the Inverse Mill’s ratio is highly significant, which confirms
that countries are self-selected to trade and justifies the use of the Heckman procedure.
To further explore the dual effects of MRLs on the intensive and extensive margins
of trade, we compute the marginal effects of MRLs along both margins. This pursuit
enables us to investigate whether MRLs influence international trade primarily through
altering the size of trade or affecting the partnership between countries. Specifically, we
define the marginal effects along the intensive margin as the impacts on the volume of
trade in terms of elasticities. In the Heckman model, these marginal effects are identical to
the raw estimates in the outcome equation. We define the marginal effects along the
extensive margin as the impacts on the percentage change in the probability of trade. In the
Heckman model, these marginal effects deviate from the raw estimates in the selection
equation by a factor of the fitted probabilities of trade.
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of MRLs through both margins of trade. We
find that tougher MRLs entice more demand primarily through the intensive margin,
suggesting that the higher food safety would benefit established bilateral exchanges more
than new ones. The costs associated with MRLs reduce the volumes high-income OECD
import from supplying countries, but barely affect the likelihood of trade partnership.
Furthermore, we test whether the net impact of importers’ MRLs is zero, given that both
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shifters are at work. Statistically, the hypothesis amounts to the parameter constraint

   =0. As shown in Table 3, the P-values for the Chi-square statistics lead us to
reject the hypothesis that the overall impact of MRLs imposed by high-income OECD
countries is negligible for their imports of plant products. Note that the net impact of
MRLs is positive on high-income OECD members’ imports of plant products, which
invalidates the conventional wisdom that stringent food safety will impede trade. To put
the results into economic perspective, we find that the high-income OECD members’
imports of these products would decrease by nearly 12% if the member countries
uniformly defer their MRLs to Codex recommendations.
Table 3. Marginal effects of MRLs on high-income OECD’ import of plant products
Intensive margin
Extensive margin
0.707***
0.315
Demand-enhancing effect
(0.052)
(0.295)
-0.250***
0.028
Trade-cost effect
(0.059)
(0.043)
H0: the net effect of importer’s MRLs is zero.
P value for the test statistic
0.000
0.000
Note: Marginal effects are computed as the averages of marginal effects for individual observations.
Standard errors in parenthesis are derived from the Delta method. Notations *, **, and *** denote
significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.

In the less or least developed countries, their lack of financial and technological
resources to comply with the MRLs adopted in the high-income OECD countries
presumably puts their agricultural exporters at disadvantages in the world market. From
the viewpoint of international development, it is interesting to investigate if the trade
costs due to MRLs are disproportionally borne by exporters from the less or least
developed world. To test this hypothesis, we split the entire sample into two sub-samples:
South-to-North trade and North-to-North trade. Specifically, we refer to the 20 highincome OECD countries whose imports we focus on as North countries. In terms of per-
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capita income, the North countries are OECD members with per-capita income above
20,000 in 2012 US dollars. The group of the remaining 40 countries is referred to as
South. Using the two sub-samples, we estimate system (9a)-(9c) again and report the
estimated coefficients in Table 4 and the marginal effects in Table 5.
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ import of plant products
from the South and the North
South-to-North
North-to-North
Variable
Outcome
Selection
Outcome
Selection
{parameter}
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Demand shifter
0.745***
0.155***
0.928***
0.248***
(0.068)
(0.020)
(0.084)
(0.021)
{  }
Trade-cost shifter -0.421***
-0.009
-0.259***
-0.041
(0.077)
(0.023)
(0.093)
(0.025)
{   }
ln(Prod)
1.182***
0.238***
1.144***
0.211***
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.028)
(0.003)
{1   }
ln(Tariff)
-0.345***
-0.252***
-2.477***
-0.588***
(0.131)
(0.038)
(0.195)
(0.048)
{  }
ln(Dist.)
-2.411***
-0.694***
-1.890***
-0.560***
(0.059)
(0.010)
(0.091)
(0.017)
{  bd }
-0.327**
-0.488***
2.019***
0.668***
Border
(0.140)
(0.040)
(0.183)
(0.083)
{ bb }
1.367***
0.314***
-0.310***
-0.089***
Colony
(0.070)
(0.020)
(0.117)
(0.031)
{ bc }

Language
{ bl }
Inverse Mills
Ratio
# of Obs.

0.663***
(0.056)
3.371***
(0.104)
42,667

0.229***
(0.015)
-235,160

0.686***
(0.102)
3.199***
(0.191)
15,936

0.212***
(0.026)
-80,237

Note: The year-specific importing countries’ fixed effects and the year-specific and chapterspecific exporting countries’ fixed effects are included in the regressions but omitted from the
table for brevity. Chapter-specific common religion variables are used as the excluded
variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Notations *, **, and *** denote significance
levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.
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Table 5. Marginal effects of MRLs on high-income OECD’ import of plant products
from the South and the North
South-to-North
North-to-North
Intensive
Extensive
Intensive
Extensive
Margin
Margin
Margin
Margin
0.745***
0.334
0.928***
0.473
Demand(0.464)
(0.084)
(0.375)
enhancing (0.068)
Effect
-0.259***
-0.078
Trade-cost -0.421*** -0.020
(0.077)
(0.057)
(0.093)
(0.078)
Effect
H0: zero net effect of importer’s MRLs
P value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note: Marginal effects are computed as the averages of marginal effects for individual
observations. Standard errors in parenthesis are derived from the Delta method.
Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.
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We first discuss the results in Table 4. In either the North-to-North or South-toNorth trade, we find consistent evidence that the MRLs adopted by high-income OECD
countries affect both sides of the market in plant product. Moreover, the MRL regulations
influence trade primarily through the intensive margin. We leave the discussion of the
magnitudes of the dual effects until the marginal effects are derived, as shown in Table 5.
In terms of other sources of trade cost, we find that further tariff liberalization
would benefit North-to-North trade more than South-to-North trade. One reason is that
the less or least developed regions have been granted zero or low tariff rates, due to
various regional and preferential trade agreements, so the potential gains from further
tariff cut is diminishing. Geographic distance impedes South-to-North trade more than
North-to-North trade, possibly due to their difference in logistics and other infrastructure.
Historical colonial ties are more important for the partnership between South and North,
rather than within North countries. The impacts of other trade determinants are similar as
in the pooled regression.
Next we focus on the marginal effects of MRLs in Table 5. All marginal effects
bear the expected signs and support the hypothesis that the MRL regulations improve
food safety as well as impose additional costs of trade. Furthermore, MRLs affect
international trade mostly by altering the size of trade between existing trade partners.
Trade partnership, however, is not hindered by MRL stringency. We also find that the
demand-enhancing effect is stronger for shipments from North countries than those from
South countries. This result suggests that consumers concerning food safety might have
origin preferences. More importantly, we find that MRLs hinder the export flows from
the South more than those from the North. This finding implies that the producers and
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processors in the South countries have more difficulty complying with the MRL
regulations imposed in high-income OECD countries. Overall, we find that the demandenhancing effect of MRLs outweighs its trade-cost effect for either imports from the
North or the South. Therefore, MRLs as a policy tool to ensure food safety can achieve
legitimate policy objectives without trade contraction.
3.4.

Diagnostic analysis
One caveat in our econometric specification is the missing tariffs. In particular,

we reduce the size of sample by nearly 15 percent by removing observations without
tariff information in Macmap. To check the implications of the missing data problem, we
keep the entire data sample but replace the tariff variable with a dummy variable
indicating the engagement in one or more regional trade agreements between countries.26
Consequently, we gain more degree of freedom at the expense of rougher measurement
of border taxes.
The supplementary results, shown in Appendix C, are qualitatively equivalent to
the baseline results. In particular, we find that MRL stringency jointly enhance the import
demand and hinder foreign exporters’ supply. However, it is less clear that exporters
from the South are more adversely affected than their competitors from the North. In
addition, regional trade agreements facilitate international trade in plant products, as
expected.
4. Conclusions

The increasing predominance of SPS measures and TBTs and their implications on
international trade and development are vexing issues for stake holders and policy

26

See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm for a database for regional trade
agreements available from the WTO.
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makers. In particular, a large number of the WTO trade disputes citing the SPS and TBT
agreements concern agriculture and food sectors, where market imperfections are
prevalent. The corrective role of SPS measures and TBTs calls for a different analytical
framework that captures both the impacts on consumers and producers. In this article, we
propose a generalized gravity equation model identifying the separate impacts of MRLs,
an important form of SPS measures, on both sides of the market for food imports.
An application of our proposed model to high-income OECD countries’ imports
of plant products delivers two robust results. First, MRLs enhances the import demand by
ensuring higher food safety, as well as reduces export supply by imposing additional
costs. Second, the compliance costs associated with MRLs put exporters from the less
and least developed countries at a disadvantage in the world market for plant products.
However, MRL stringency does not hinder the creation of new trade partnership. These
findings contribute to the debate of SPS measures and TBTs. Our case study shows that
the regulatory policies can achieve legitimate goals without impeding international trade
in their cumulative effects. In addition, our proposed model helps rationalizing the mixed
findings in the literature and provides analytical foundation that could be extended to
welfare analysis.
Future research could investigate the welfare implications of MRLs, accounting
for the external or social benefits, such as better human health in the long run. With a
reasonable measurement the non-market values of MRLs, one can fully analyze the
benefits and costs of MRLs and identify the MRLs that are socially optimal for the global
market.
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Appendix A
Table A. Names of plant products, based on the Harmonized System
Chapter Description
Product names (HS 4 or 6 digits)
HS-06
live trees & other plants
canna, chufa, dasheen
HS-07
edible vegetables
artichoke, asparagus, bean*, broccoli, Brussels
sprouts, bulb onion, cabbage, cassava(roots), celery,
chickpea, chicory(tops), chrysanthemum, cucumber,
eggplant, endive, garden beet(roots), garlic, green
onion, lentil, lettuce(head), lettuce(leaf), mushroom,
non-bell pepper, olive, pea*, potato, spinach, squash,
sweet potato, tomato, turnip
HS-08
edible fruits & nuts,
almond, apple*, apricot , avocado, blueberry,
peel of citrus/melons
beechnut, Brazil nut, cantaloupe, cashew, cherry,
chestnut, coconut, date, dry prune plum , fresh prune
plum, grape, grapefruit, guava, hazelnut, kiwifruit,
kumquat, loquat, nectarine, orange, papaya, peach,
pear, pineapple, pistachios, plantain, raisin,
strawberry*, tangelo, walnut, watermelon,
youngberry*
HS-09
coffee, tea, mate & spices ginger, pepper, summer savory
HS-10
Cereals
barley, corn, corn salad, lupin, millet*, oat, rice,
sorghum, wheat
HS-12
oil seeds/ misc. grains/
cotton seed, hop(dried cones), mustard spinach,
med. plants/ straw
peanut, sesame seed, sugar beet (roots)
Note: Products with * have multiple matches in the HS classifications. See Li and Beghin (2012b) for details.
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Appendix B
Table B. List of importing and exporting countries
Importing countries
Exporting countries

Australia

New
Zealand

Algeria

Dominican Rep.

Israel

Pakistan

Thailand

Belgium

Portugal

Argentina

Ecuador

Italy

Panama

Trinidad/
Tobago

Canada

Rep. of
Korea

Australia

Egypt

Jamaica

Peru

Tunisia

Denmark

Spain

Bahamas

El
Salvador

Japan

Philippine

Turkey

Finland

Sweden

Barbados

Finland

Jordan

Poland

United
Arab
Emirates

France

United
Kingdoms

Belgium

France

Kenya

Portugal

United
Kingdoms

Germany

United
States

Brazil

Germany

Lebanon

Rep. of
Korea

United
States

Greece

Canada

Greece

Malaysia

Russia
Venezuela
Federation

Ireland

Chile

Guatemala Mexico

Singapore

Israel

China

Honduras

Morocco

South
Africa

Italy

Columbia

Hong
Kong

Netherlands

Spain

Japan

Costa
Rica

Indonesia

New
Zealand

Sri Lanka

Netherlands

Denmark

Ireland

Nicaragua

Sweden

Vietnam

Note: Importing countries are selected OECD members with nominal per-capita GDP over 20,000 US dollars as
of 2012. Source: International Monetary Fund.

32

Appendix C
Table C. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD’ import of plant products
from the South and the North, with tariff replaced by RTAs
South-to-North
North-to-North
Variable
Outcome
Selection
Outcome
Selection
Equation
Equation
Equation
Equation
Demand shifter
0.601***
0.091***
0.932***
0.288***
(0.065)
(0.019)
(0.075)
(0.018)
Trade-cost shifter -0.308***
0.046**
-0.462***
-0.114***
(0.074)
(0.023)
(0.082)
(0.022)
ln(Prod)
1.192***
0.236***
1.120***
0.213***
(0.017)
(0.001)
(0.026)
(0.003)
RTA
0.549***
0.274***
0.540***
-0.003
(0.056)
(0.015)
(0.092)
(0.025)
ln(Dist.)
-2.221***
-0.575***
-1.689***
-0.580***
(0.054)
(0.010)
(0.082)
(0.015)
Border
-0.019
-0.278***
1.735***
0.649***
(0.140)
(0.040)
(0.177)
(0.082)
Colony
1.336***
0.297***
-0.165
-0.090***
(0.068)
(0.019)
(0.105)
(0.028)
Language
0.732***
0.260***
0.459***
0.188***
(0.055)
(0.014)
(0.087)
(0.023)
Inverse Mills
3.449***
-2.968***
-Ratio
(0.101)
(0.175)
# of Obs.
46,412
270,690
18,555
98,351
Note: RTAs refers to Regional Trade Agreements. The year-specific importing countries’
fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific exporting countries’ fixed effects are
included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Chapter-specific common
religion variables are used as the excluded variables. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Notations *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively.
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